Are Madisonian Institutions Broken?
October 21-22, 2009
The Madisonian System in Modern America: Is it Broken, and Can We Fix It?
Presenters for this interactive conference included William F. Connelly, Jr. from Washington & Lee University, and Pietro Nivola, Sarah Binder, William Galson, and Benjamin Wittes, all Senior Fellows in Governance Studies at The Brookings Institution. Click here for the complete program agenda.
The following videos were excerpted from longer presentations made at the Center for the Constitution for this conference in October 2009.
William Connelly, Professor, Department of Politics, Washington & Lee University
Why Madison Still Rules America
James Madison rules America. The Constitution governs. James Madison rules America since our constitutional structure constantly confronts congressional parties with a strategic conundrum that is a staple in analysis by journalists and political scientists: Are the majority and minority parties part of the government or part of the opposition? Should they pursue policy or play politics? Should they promote compromise or confrontation? Be bipartisan or partisan? Constitutional analysis is critical to comprehending contemporary congressional behavior.
In this video, Bill Connelly examines these questions, concluding that the constancy of this conundrum confirms the Constitution governs. Indeed, the Constitution governs in a way neither party governs. Neither party in our separation of powers system is ever simply the government or the opposition; instead, each party is constantly wracked on the horns of this dilemma. The Constitution governs in the sense that each party is perpetually divided into internal party factions contending over the correct answer to this legislative party strategic dilemma. Certainly, Republicans and Democrats constantly fight between themselves, but both parties just as commonly fight among themselves. Madison stirs constant infighting within the two parties in Congress by foisting this strategic dilemma on congressional parties. The Constitution precludes the formation of a "government" or an "opposition." At any given time neither the President, nor Congress governs; neither branch alone is the government. At any given time, neither Democrats nor Republicans are the government pure and simple; indeed, at all times both parties are both government and opposition. Consequently, bipartisan compromise and partisan confrontation are both appropriate legislative strategies. The Constitution governs because no one else governs.
Pietro Nivola, Senior Fellow, Governance Studies, The Brookings Institution
Contemporary Political Parties: What Would the Founders Have Thought?
The Republican and Democratic parties at present are more discordant than they have been in at least a generation. If James Madison were alive today, how vexed would he be by their heightened partisanship and polarization?
In this video, Pietro Nivola explores this not-so-simple question in four steps. First, for those who may still doubt the extent of the phenomenon, he will sketch the depth of the divergence between the parties these days, not only at the level of policymaking elites but in the mass electorate. Next, the speaker discusses the implications for the democratic process and the health of the polity. Third, our polarized parties are compared with party politics during the early years of the Republic. Finally, he concludes that although Madison would not have deemed perfectly safe or sound every feature of the contemporary partisan divide, he probably would have been neither surprised nor especially unsettled by most of it.
Sarah Binder, Senior Fellow, Governance Studies, The Brookings Institution
Congress: The Politics of Stalemate
Is today's Congress broken or is its messy, slow legislative process more or less what the Framers envisioned? Was our system designed for deadlock and inaction or would James Madison have been dismayed to see modern congressional dysfunction?
In this video, Sarah Binder argues that Congress is, indeed, broken-that Madison would not have recognized the institution he sought to create in today's legislature. Record numbers of filibusters, cloture motions, and holds on nominations in the Senate, excessive majoritarianism in the House of Representatives, limited interest in oversight of the Executive Branch, and consistently missed deadlines for budgetary legislation all testify to Congress's increasing failure to function as the empowered legislature Madison sought to create. Binder discusses the electoral, partisan, and institutional pathologies at the root of the change.
Bill Galston, Senior Fellow, Governance Studies, The Brookings Institution
Institutional Reform for a Modern Madisonian State
If James Madison examined modern American government, what would surprise and disappoint him-and would he support fundamental reform of the institutions he created?
In this video, Bill Galston argues that Madison would have been surprised by the development of sharply-polarized American political parties, the growth of executive power, the proliferation of interest groups, and the growth of federal authority relative to the states. By contrast, Galston argues, he would not have been surprised by the tendency of modern politicians, driven by such factors, to focus on the country's short-term needs and interests at the expense of its long-term health. And he would have seen a renewed focus on the health of institutions as critical to maintaining an appropriate focus on the country's longer-term interests and would have seen reform of America's political institutiosn as key to engineering more an effective politics in the modern era. Institutional innovation, Galston contends, is a Madisonian solution to what ails the institutions Madison himself created. And he goes on to explore what such Madisonian reform might look like.
Benjamin Wittes, Senior Fellow, Governance Studies, The Brookings Institution
The Judicial Nomination Process and the Growth of Judicial Power
The process for confirming federal judges has changed dramatically over the past three decades, during which more confirmations to more courts are taking longer more of the time. Is this a good thing or a bad thing? And what does it say about the judiciary itself and our attitudes towards it?
In this video, Benjamin Wittes examines both the health of the process for confirming judges and the underlying health of the federal judiciary more generally. He argues that the changes in the confirmation process are an institutional response to the remarkable growth of judicial power in the modern era-a growth the Framers did not remotely contemplate and by which they would have been shocked. He describes this growth as a matter of general political consensus in the United States, one that drives a more vigilant gate-keeping function for the Senate.
